Introduction
The first marshal of the Vice-Admiralty Court at the Cape of Good Hope having been historically a controversial figure, 1 I was greatly surprised when it turned out that the second and long-serving holder of the office, Denis O'Bryen, 2 was likewise considered to have been a personality of some note. An Irish-born dramatist, political pamphleteer, and confidant and aide to the prominent Whig politician Charles James Fox, his life merited a brief entry in the British Dictionary of National Biography. However, I was to discover that there was more to his appointment as Admiralty marshal at the Cape than at first appeared. When the British re-occupied the settlement at the Cape of Good Hope in January 1806, they soon recognised the need to re-establish a local Vice-Admiralty Court; the one that had operated during the First Occupation had been closed down in 1803. 4 In the absence of such a court, several Anglo-Dutch and some purely British prize issues flowing from the Occupation 5 and those likely to arise locally from the war being waged against France at that time, could only be resolved inconveniently and at great expense by the Court of Admiralty in London. 6 The instructions issued in August 1806 to the first permanent governor of the Cape after re-occupation, the Earl of Caledon, referred to his receiving an Admiralty Commission constituting him Vice Admiral of the settlement at the Cape. 7 The royal instructions, issued in September 1806 by Letters Patent under Privy Seal to the Lords of Admiralty, to appoint a Vice Admiral at the Cape explained that it would be advantageous "to have a Court of Vice Admiralty settled there". It specifically authorised and empowered the Lords to do so (it appeared that they might have See, eg, idem vol 5 at 413, concerning the ship Fortuna, sailing under Mecklenburg colours en route to Batavia. She was detained in Table Bay in May 1806 and her papers, together with other supporting documentation, were "transmitted ... to His Majesty's Court of Admiralty [in London] for adjudication". Subsequently Sir David Beard, commandant at the Cape, was compelled to deny in a letter to the secretary of state Viscount Castlereagh that he had taken it upon himself to decide this prize cause and to appropriate the prize property (idem vol 6 at 158). 7
Idem vol 6 at 15-16.
had no such power in respect of newly conquered territories) by appointing a Vice Admiral and also a Vice-Admiralty judge and other proper officers required for the functioning of a Court of Vice Admiralty at the Cape, and to issue such commissions as would be necessary. 8 in the local Vice-Admiralty Court. In 1891, when Vice-Admiralty courts were finally abolished, 17 Lord Henry de Villiers was accordingly the last specifically appointed Admiralty judge at the Cape.
At the risk of unnecessary repetition, it may be apposite briefly to identify the main features of Vice-Admiralty courts, including the one at the Cape of Good Hope. 18 First, they were imperial (British) and not colonial courts and have to be distinguished, in the case of the Cape, from the local Council of Justice (Raad van Justitie) and its successor, the Cape Supreme Court. The judge of the local ViceAdmiralty Court was therefore not, as such, a colonial judge, even if, subsequently, the local Chief Justice was also appointed by the British Admiralty as the local Admiralty judge.
Secondly, the Cape Vice-Admiralty Court did not, like the Council of Justice and later the Supreme Court, apply local Roman-Dutch law, but English law. More particularly, it applied English maritime and Admiralty law that, even though it often displayed its civil-law origins, certainly no longer resembled the applicable local law.
Thirdly, Vice-Admiralty courts exercised a permanent instance jurisdiction of variable scope at different times over various questions of maritime law such as the carriage of goods by or collisions at sea, or the claims of seamen and salvors. In addition, it could also exercise a prize jurisdiction, which was unusual in that it was limited in both scope and duration by the terms of the Commission conferring the jurisdiction on it. 19 A Prize court, therefore, was simply an Admiralty (or Vice-Admiralty) court exercising, for the time being, a specially conferred prize jurisdiction.
Fourthly, the permanent Cape Vice-Admiralty Court should be distinguished from an ad hoc, temporary court, generally known as a Piracy Court or Commission Court (because it was constituted in every case by a Commission 20 and comprised his failing health came in his seventy-fifth year, in Sep 1855, when Wylde suffered a stroke while delivering judgment in a slave-trading case as Admiralty judge. On Wylde, see Roberts (n 11) at 384; Girvin (n 11) at 295-298 and 662; and F St LS "Sir Johyn Wylde" (1933) 50 SALJ 284-297. 17 See, further, n 220 below. 18 For more detail, with references, see Van Niekerk (n 1) at 499-504. 19 The British authorities seem to have been caught unawares by the War of 1812 with the United States. As a result, the detention of American ships at the Cape in 1813 caused "considerable embarrassment and difficulty" because the local Vice-Admiralty Court received no orders (ie, from a Commission conferring prize jurisdiction on it) enabling it to proceed to their condemnation (Theal RCC (n 5) vol 9 at 176-177 and 222). 20 The absence of such a Commission and the Vice-Admiralty Court's perceived lack of criminal jurisdiction caused severe problems and heated debate in 1825. The reason was that British seamen and others accused of mutiny or murder at sea could be, and were, tried by the local colonial court applying "Dutch law" rather than by a (local) British court applying English criminal law (see, eg, Theal RCC (n 5) vol 23 at 9, 451-454, 471-472, 481, 485-486 and 497-498). By Apr a body of Commissioners) but also confusingly referred to simply as an Admiralty Court. 21 This Court had criminal jurisdiction over (serious) offences committed on the high seas, including, therefore, piracy, and was made up of seven Commissioners, the judge of the local Vice-Admiralty Court being but one of the members.
Fifthly, despite its name and the involvement of the Admiralty in its establishment and the appointment of its judges, a Vice-Admiralty court was not a naval court. In this respect, therefore, it should be distinguished from naval courts-martial, which had jurisdiction over naval (as opposed to maritime) matters such as those relating to the discipline of officers and seamen of the Royal Navy.
Despite the differences between the Cape Vice-Admiralty Court and the local colonial courts -first, the Council of Justice and later the Cape Supreme Courtone common but complicating factor was that their jurisdictions overlapped. Some maritime matters could be heard in either court and claimants could often choose in which one to lodge their claims. The success or failure of those claims could well depend on their choice because the courts applied different laws and followed distinct procedures. In addition, if there were several claimants, the same matter could even be heard simultaneously but separately in the two courts. 22 Even at an early stage many instances of jurisdictional clashes between the two courts were brought to the attention of the authorities, 23 but the problem was 1826, the authorities in London acknowledged "that a competent jurisdiction should be forthwith established" at the Cape and instructed the Admiralty to issue an appropriate Commission for that purpose (idem vol 26 at 263). However, that seems not to have happened. In Aug 1827 the report of the Commission of Enquiry into the administration of justice at the Cape observed in respect of criminal law and jurisprudence that the criminal jurisdiction exercised by the Council of Justice over crimes committed in the colony had been extended, on rather doubtful authority, to those committed on ships when at sea or anchored in the harbours of the colony, and that no Commission of Piracy had yet been issued superseding that jurisdictional cognizance (idem vol 33 at 53). 21 See Van Zyl (n 4) at 445. 22 To clarify, the Vice-Admiralty Court exercised not only concurrent jurisdiction in some matters, but also a separate and exclusive jurisdiction in others, (see, eg, the instructions to the Commission of Enquiry into the Cape in Theal RCC (n 5) vol 15 at 239). The same was, of course, true of the Council of Justice. 23 In May 1808, eg, the Vice-Admiralty Court in the person of its deputy marshal and the Council of Justice represented by the sheriff were involved in a quite undignified judicial boat race across Table Bay when both attempted to be the first to arrest, and hence assert jurisdiction over, a suspected slaver, the Portuguese ship Rosalia. On arriving at the ship, the deputy marshal pushed the sheriff away and was thus first on board, but each claimed and, assuming a plea of prior capture, instituted proceedings against the ship in his own court. The Council of Justice complained to the governor that the Admiralty marshal had impeded the sheriff in the execution of his duties. Ultimately the Vice-Admiralty Court ordered the release of the Rosalia while the Council of Justice condemned her, but after an investigation, decided not to proceed any further (see Theal RCC (n 5) vol 6 at 330-331; Edwards (n 4); and HB Giliomee "Die administrasietydperk van Lord Caledon 1807-1811" in (1966) no 2 Archives Year Book for South African History 213-366 at 254-255 (referring to the clash as a "komiese situasie" causing the governor "groot verleentheid").
not addressed and continued to arise from time to time. 24 When the issue was brought to their attention in 1820, the view of the authorities in London was that the Vice-Admiralty Court's jurisdiction over certain matters was settled and could not be contested by the local colonial court, even if it did possess an overlapping jurisdictional power. In short, the prior jurisdiction of any of the two courts could not be superseded. While that seemingly settled the matter in practice, 25 it did not eliminate the continuing concurrency of jurisdiction of the two courts in appropriate cases. 26 A further suggestion, in 1822, that a newly reformed colonial court should be vested with Admiralty jurisdiction "by which means past collisions would be avoided", 27 was not fully realised when the Cape Supreme Court was established in 1827. 28 The Vice-Admiralty Court continued to exist and exercise its distinct jurisdiction as before, but at least now the Chief Justice, who was also as such the Admiralty judge, could himself properly manage any jurisdictional collisions. The conflict continued even when, in 1891, the local colonial court was vested with Admiralty jurisdiction, since that court had to apply different laws, depending on which jurisdiction (civilian or Admiralty) it was exercising. 29 24 For instance, in 1818, in connection with the jurisdiction over slaves either taken from captured slavers or abandoned by the masters of such ships (see, eg, the correspondence in Theal RCC (n 5) vol 11 at 475-480 and vol 12 at 1-4). In 1821, again, the Council of Justice's John Truter complained to the governor about the Vice-Admiralty Court's exercise of its jurisdiction. In consequence, the deputy marshal was prevented from advertising the sale of a vessel that had already been sold by order of the Council of Justice. In response, Admiralty Judge George Kekewich complained about this "prohibition", causing the governor to bring the matter to the attention of the authorities in London, because it not only had judicial implications -appeals, eg, went to different courts -but also financial implications for the colonial government which would get nothing out of Admiralty confiscations but one The matter was finally resolved only in the late twentieth century when the law to be applied in the resolution of particular maritime issues was prescribed by statute, a compromise solution not acceptable to all, given that South African law, drawing on its subsidiary common law, was retained in respect of some maritime matters. 30 
The Admiralty marshal
After the judge and the registrar, the Admiralty marshal was the most important official in any Vice-Admiralty court and, by the nature of his duties, also the one most in the public eye. 31 The marshal's main duty was to serve Admiralty processes. After a plaintiff had met the necessary requirements regarding the nature and, in the case of an action in rem, the object of his claim, the Court's registrar issued a warrant to the marshal directing him to arrest the ship or cargo in question or, in the more unusual case of an action in personam, to serve it upon the defendant. The marshal or his deputy served the warrant, in the case of a vessel, "in the time-honoured manner of exhibiting the original and holding it to the mainmast, then nailing a copy in its place". 32 He then executed a certificate of service, commonly called the marshal's return, which was filed in the Court's registry together with the original warrant. In the case of an action in personam, where the warrant was for the arrest of a person, the marshal exhibited it and took the defendant into custody, from which he was released upon the provision of security.
33
Once a ship was arrested, the marshal, if necessary left a member of his staff on board to prevent her sailing from the Court's jurisdiction and to protect her from damage or pillage while in custody. In the case of arrested cargo, the marshal had to see to its discharge and warehousing. Failing in his duty to protect arrested property from damage could lay the marshal open to a claim in damages. The Solis (1885) 5 Aspinall's Maritime Law Cases 368, the Court observed in passing that only the marshal had the right to board a ship and nail a writ of summons in rem to the mast and that the representative might be trespassing if he tried to do so. 33 Later, the defendant was merely served with an instrument called a "monition", addressed to the marshal and commanding him to cite the defendant personally and "admonish" him to appear in court (Wiswall (n 31) at 63). 34 See The Hoop (1801) 4 C Rob 145, 165 ER 566 for an instance of a successful claim against the Admiralty marshal for the compensation of loss sustained by pillage and theft whilst the property Once a ship or other maritime property had been condemned by the Admiralty court, the marshal had the duty of arranging for a sale in execution. He had to appraise, advertise and then sell the property by auction. Before 1840, the Admiralty marshal was not salaried, but received his income from fees, including a brokerage fee that was customarily charged on the sale of maritime property.
The marshal also had other public duties, including appearing at official and public ceremonies -such as piracy executions or judicial processions -where he bore the Court's silver oar mace. 35 
3
O'Bryen's early life
Denis O'Bryen 36 was born in Ireland in 1755. He qualified as a surgeon, moved to London and in the 1780s relinquished the practice of his profession and turned his hand to writing and a political career. As will be apparent, these two pursuits were closely linked.
37
He first gained notoriety with the publication, in 1782, of a satirical and sarcastic pamphlet entitled A Defence of ... the Earl of Shelburne, from the Reproaches of His Numerous Enemies ... . 38 He had written it anonymously but in the hope of preferment from one (the Rockingham) faction of the liberal Whig party and of gaining the attention of one of the party's rising stars, Charles James Fox. It was an immediate success, selling out quickly and necessitating several reprints. In a portent of what was in his custody. The Court rejected the marshal's defence that he was unable to protect the property properly because his fees were too small. The Court thought that if arrested property were lost or damaged, the marshal had at least to show that this had not been through any default of his own. If indeed his fees were insufficient to enable him to provide proper security, this should be raised with relevant authorities, but could not be relied on as a defence. 35 In addition, O'Bryen was an irrepressible writer of letters to newspapers on various topical and invariably political issues, so much so that he is considered a "journalistic figure" of the period.
44 His political writings reflected his activism as a supporter of the Whig cause and of Fox; and he has been described as being "of some help to Fox and his friends with their newspaper problems", that is, the attacks on Fox's lifestyle and views by the London press. 45 O'Bryen continued to fire off missives to the press throughout his life. In 1820 he admitted being "in the course of my life, and still an occasional correspondent of several papers ... like thousands of others", but denied ever having had any ownership, managerial employment or other concerns in any newspaper. 46 Then, of course, there are also numerous but scattered pieces of correspondence with and from O'Bryen. There are several references in published sources to archival materials 47 Westminster", 56 and a "zealous political partisan" of Fox with whom he was "on terms of great intimacy". 57 In short, O'Bryen was more than "a bit player in Whiggish politics"; he was "an important figure in the Whig world over a period of decades".
58
However, in attaining this position of political importance, O'Bryen did more than merely put pen to paper.
In November 1782, for instance, he fought a duel 59 in Brighton with the lawyer, Thomas Erskine, already an established figure in legal and Whig political circles.
60
Their disagreement and its eventual favourable and magnanimous resolution appear to have been carefully calculated by O'Bryen with a view to gaining maximum political advancement in a cliquish Whig world.
61
In June 1786, O'Bryen was involved as a witness for Fox in a civil trial in the Court of Common Pleas. 62 Fox had demanded compliance from Corbet, the high bailiff of Westminster, with a writ issued by the Court of Exchequer to return himself and another as elected members of Parliament for the City of Westminster, but compliance was delayed. Fox won the case and received the ₤2 000 damages he had claimed for losses caused and expenses incurred. Many years later, in 1798, O'Bryen was heavily involved in two trials 64 that showed not only his Whig connections but also that he remained "a proud and patriotic Irishman with a fervent interest in promoting his country". 65 The first was the political trial 66 of Arthur O'Connor 67 and four other Irishmen for high treason.
68 They appeared before the Court held under Special Commission at Maidstone, on 21 and 22 May 1798. At the time, United Irishmen were hoping to receive the help of France in a planned rebellion that ultimately proved unsuccessful. The indictment against the accused included three separate acts of treason: "compassing" the King's death; aiding and comforting the King's enemies; and persuading and engaging the French government and subjects to invade Britain with force. After two marathon sessions, 69 and having heard the evidence for the prisoners from a galaxy of liberal political luminaries -Fox, Sheridan, Erskine, Lord John Russell and Lord Thanet -the jury took just forty minutes to find one of the accused 72 and was described, rather hyperbolically, by the attorneygeneral as concerning the commission of "an offence which appears to me to be one of the most heinous, the consideration of which has been offered, in the history of our law, to the decision of a jury".
There were a number of witnesses for the accused, including Sheridan. 73 With regard to O'Bryen, he stated that he knew him intimately and confirmed that he was "a strong man" who could, had he wanted to, have assisted O'Connor in escaping, but was instead arguing with the officials present.
74 From the evidence presented, 75 so 70 In the absence of mitigating circumstances, James O'Coigley (or Quigley), received the "usual sentence" for high treason and was executed near Maidstone on 7 Jun. The usual sentence, according to Barfoot (n 68) at 54, was for the prisoner "to be hanged, but not until he be dead; to be taken down while still alive, and then to have his heart and bowels taken out and burnt before his face; his head to be severed from his body; and his body to be divided into four quarters". Although two of the accused were found guilty and two others were acquitted,
77
O'Bryen was found not guilty. The end of his direct and active involvement with Fox and the Whigs was, however, not many years away. When the Pitt government resigned in February 1801, Fox "returned" to active politics. On Pitts' death in January 1806, he entered into an understanding with the Grenville faction of the Whig party, which took office as the "ministry of all talents" in January 1806, with Fox again being appointed as foreign secretary.
However, by then Fox was already ill and he died in September 1806. On the death of his friend and patron, O'Bryen wrote a letter to The Times, modestly putting himself forward by raising the prospect of his being asked to stand for election to the vacant seat in Westminster. He observed that "[a] fit successor to him, who is no more, one cannot expect; for his equal is not in the creation", but nevertheless claimed to be worthy of consideration as such "on the score of the connection that for twenty-five years bound me to the cause and service of that illustrious person".
78
Nothing came of this. The Whigs were in power for only a few more months but by then O'Bryen had already secured another advancement from his Whig connections. 79 On 30 August 1806, The Times 80 announced that Lord Howick 81 had appointed Denis O'Bryen, Esq, "to the office of Marshal of the Vice Admiralty Court of the 76 More specifically there was no evidence from his conduct in court of any evil design, much less of a concerted one with the other defendants. He was not implicated at all in the riot, nor concerned in any violence or disturbance whatsoever. In short, the defence suggested, as far as O'Bryen was concerned, "there is literally no proof to be answered" (idem at 883 and see, also, at 905). 77 Thanet was fined ₤1 000 and sentenced to one year's imprisonment in the Tower of London;
Ferguson was fined ₤100 and imprisoned for one year, while Browne and Thompson were acquitted with the prosecution's consent. The conviction must be seen in the light of the evidence showing the riotous conduct of Thanet and Ferguson and the explanation by Lord Kenyon in his summing up for the jury. He observed that there was no doubt that O'Connor was not entitled to be discharged, because when a verdict of acquittal is entered, the judge may order the party in question to be detained and compel him to answer other charges that may have been brought against him (idem at 940 Cape of Good Hope". The report continued that when his lordship had communicated his appointment to O'Bryen, he enhanced its value by the assurance that O'Bryen owed it to "the particular request of Mr Fox, as a return for his long, zealous, and faithful attachment". The office was said, the report continued, to be of considerable emolument "and can be executed by Deputy". By the time O'Bryen gained entry into the Dictionary of National Biography, his appointment in 1806 "to the patent office of marshal of the Admiralty [sic] at the Cape of Good Hope, worth, it was said ₤4 000 per annum", was described as a "lucrative sinecure".
82
Clearly O'Bryen's appointment as marshal of the Vice-Admiralty Court at the Cape of Good Hope was not an ordinary appointment involving his translocation to the settlement to take up his duties there. Some explanation of sinecure appointments and patent offices is therefore required.
4
Patent offices and colonial appointments
Until well into the nineteenth century, a "complex and unsystematic" system of patronage existed in respect of various public offices and positions in the United Kingdom. 83 The system included not only the bestowal of honours (knighthoods, peerages, court appointments and nominations to various chivalrous orders), but also the nomination to salaried offices -so-called salaried patronage. Nominations were usually for life and were not revocable, at least not legally. They were for important posts involving the performance of serious and demanding duties, as well as the most glaring of sinecures. 84 Public servants were so appointed, often with no or inadequate qualification for their posts; they received little if any official remuneration or salary and derived their income from fees and gratuities levied on the public for the services leader of the Foxite faction of the Whigs and hence also of the House of Commons, holding those positions until Mar 1807 when the Whig government resigned. During the "talents ministry", Fox had secured an earldom for Grey's father, Genl Sir Charles Grey (1729-1807). In Apr 1806 Grey himself adopted the "courtesy title Viscount Howick", which he used until his father died in Nov 1807, when he inherited the earldom as the second Earl Grey and entered the House of Lords. There he remained in opposition until his appointment as Whig Prime Minister in Nov 1830 after the resignation of the Duke of Wellington's government, a position he held until Jul 1834. He is the Earl Grey after whom the bergamot-oil flavoured tea blend was named. On Earl Grey, see, further, EA Smith sv "Grey, Charles, second Earl Grey" in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography what follows in the following five paragraphs is drawn from this source. 84 The term "sinecure" is derived from "sine" (without) and "cura" (care or duty) and refers to an appointment to a salaried office that involves little or no responsibility or active service or labour on the part of the appointee. Originally of ecclesiastical origin (a benefice without the obligation of caring for souls), it was later also applied to secular offices.
they rendered in the performance of their duties. 85 For monarchs and governments the system was a powerful means of distributing patronage or rewarding or securing political support.
There were, broadly, two methods of appointment: by Letters Patent under the Great Seal, or by Warrant under the King's Sign Manual. 86 An appointment to an office by the former method was referred to as an appointment to a patent office.
As from the end of the eighteenth century, hesitant and ineffectual steps were taken to suppress sinecures, reform the system of patronage, and transform the "civil service" in an attempt to eradicate maladministration and inefficiency.
87
Public pressure for reform was kept up by a series of Black Books and Red Books, the product of the radical press, authored anonymously by "A Commoner". These books were highly critical of complex, secretive and wasteful financial management and state expenditure and included a detailed list of "Pensions, Sinecures, Places, Compensation and Emoluments" in the United Kingdom and the colonies, as well as a financial review of the income and expenditure of the civil list, Britain's finances and debt, and Crown revenues.
The first pertinent step towards reform was the appointment of a House of Commons Select Committee on Sinecures in 1810, about which more shortly. It found that there were 242 sinecures in the Kingdom and the colonies. However, general legislative reform failed and a series of legislative measures dealt in piecemeal fashion with the issue. Nevertheless, by 1834 there had been steady growth in the numbers employed by the government in its executive department or "civil" service, and there were only 108 sinecures left, most of which were already destined for extinction in due course. By 1850, "[s]inecures had lapsed into irrelevance".
88
Crown and government patronage, even if shorn of sinecures, its most objectionable feature, which continued to be the medium through which public services were recruited, slowly faded from public debate. By the mid-nineteenth century, increased regulation and re-organisation of the public service in the cause of efficiency came to restrain the free exercise of patronage. The result was the The term (litterae patentes) refers to "open" or "accessible" letters (in the sense of writing or the letters of a word, and not in the sense of an epistle, hence "letters" not "letter' patent), as opposed to sealed and private letters (litterae clausae); letters readable by everyone in that the seal was attached pendent from the document and not "sealing" or "closing" it. Collections of royal Letters Patent were taken up ("enrolled": sheets of parchment were sewn together to form a continuous roll) in Patent Rolls. 87 Bourne (n 83) at 20-24. 88 Idem at 167. appointment of those suitably qualified for office and hence "efficient" patronage.
89
By 1870 the "onslaught of merit" had seen the arrival of "open competitive entry".
90
Included in the system of patronage and the list of sinecures produced in attaining these reforms, were various judicial offices.
91 They were likewise reformed in the first half of the nineteenth century, 92 as part of a broader reform of the judicial system generally.
Briefly, as far as the superior common-law courts were concerned, 93 numerous inferior offices in these courts were either absolute sinecures in that the appointee himself did no work but earned an income from fees generated by a deputy to whom his duties were delegated, or partial sinecures. Reforms were aimed at the elimination of judicial offices that were sinecures, and the introduction of a greater reliance on salary-based compensation as well as a regulation of the collection of, and a cap on, fees by the holders of such offices. These measures were introduced piecemeal, for salaries, paid by Parliament; (2) an income derived from fees (paid by litigants as part of the cost of litigation and irrespective of the outcome of litigation; by contrast, Admiralty judges' judicial fees depended on the outcome, and earned them a substantial fee when condemning a vessel as prize but less otherwise!); and (3) an income from the appointment of individuals to offices within the judge's "gift" or patronage, which grew with the length of the judge's service as offices became vacant and required re-appointment. Unless he decided to keep an office for himself as an additional income, a judge could either sell the relevant office(s) outright (bargaining with the purchaser in the expectation that the appointment to a sinecure would provide an annuity for the individual appointed), or he could appoint a member of his own immediate or extended family or his circle of friends to the post. It is estimated that the relevant chief justices and the Chancellor in particular earned quite considerably more from fees and patronage than from their direct salaries. See, further, Pfander (n 92) at 13-18. 94 11 Geo IV & 1 Will IV c 58. It regulated the receipt and future appropriation of fees and emoluments receivable by officers of the superior courts of common law. 
97
For present purposes, though, the focus is on the system of patronage in colonial appointments, including judicial patent offices.
98
At the end of the eighteenth century, most senior colonial officials received no stipends or very small ones and were expected to live on fees levied on the public they served. The fee-earning colonial office was regarded as a form of property, which could be conferred by the Crown or the government on a subject or supporter. Hanaper, the patentee of the Subpoena Office, the registrar of affidavits and ten other equally arcane ones) connected with the Court of Chancery. In terms of s 2, though, the Act was not to be construed to determine (abolish) any of these offices at the time held in possession or reversion by any person appointed to them before Jun 1832 until the death or resignation of that person. It was followed by the Lord Chancellor's Offices Act, 1833 (3 & 4 Will IV c 84) which provided for the appointment by the Crown of "competent" persons to perform the duties of certain of those abolished offices connected with the Court of Chancery as and when they became vacant, and also for current and future office-holders to be paid by salary in full satisfaction of their services and expenses incident in its performance. 97 7 Will IV & 1 Vict c 30. The preamble observes that the duties of many officers in these courts have wholly or in part ceased, or are executed by deputy, and that the offices have, because of changes in the law, become useless and inapplicable to present practices and proceedings, but that the fees in respect of those offices continue to be payable by litigants. Further, it noted that the continuance of sinecures and useless offices tends to impair the effective administration of justice and to impose unnecessary burdens and costs on the public and litigants in those courts. The Act therefore abolished certain offices in the superior courts of common law (they are listed in Sched A to the Act and the more than forty-five offices mentioned there include, in the Court of Queen's Bench, eg, those of the clerk of rules, the clerk of papers, the signer of writs, the clerk of declarations, the clerk of errors, the clerk of the outer treasury, and "the bagbearer to the Custos The monarch or government ministers regularly used their powers of patronage, at home and abroad, to gratify friends, clients and supporters.
99
Appointment was without reference to the relevant colonial authorities -either the Colonial Office or the governor of the colony in question -by Letters Patent under the Great Seal. Further, the appointment could not be cancelled except for the gravest cause and by due process of law. In short, a colonial patent office appointment involved no fixed and secure salary but also no ready dismissal.
Nor could the Crown or government always ensure proper or even personal performance, especially in distant colonies. Appointees often arranged for the performance of any duties involved in the office by deputies, so that fee-earning offices in colonies became in effect life sinecures.
Colonial offices were often granted by Letters Patent 100 to men who had obligations or duties in England, had no intention of leaving England and residing abroad, and who performed their colonial duties by deputy. In 1821 the Red Book 101 observed sarcastically that "[m]any Honourable and Right Honourable Gentlemen fill the offices of clerks, harbour-masters, naval officers, tide-waiters, collectors, comptrollers, surveyors, &c. in places and countries which they have never seen except on the map, if they have seen them even there". Such deputies either retained a share of the fees of the office and remitted the remainder to their principal in England, or otherwise paid their principals a fixed annual lump sum, giving security for it and for the proper execution of the office.
Offices patented in the colonies covered a wide spectrum, several of them being judicial offices. 102 The only senior officials who remained, as a class, outside the system, were colonial governors and judges, who were appointed by Commissions under the Great Seal, received stipends and were not allowed to serve by deputy.
Clearly the system of patent offices had serious defects. 103 Neither the authorities in London nor the colonial governor and his administration could effectively control 99 Bourne (n 83) at 28 points out that colonial patronage and colonial appointments "were an important addition to the arsenal of ministerial patronage". 100 The procedure for appointing officials by Letters Patent was slow and complicated and involved the patentee in considerable expense, which he sought to recover, directly or through his deputy, from the collection of fees (see Parry (n 98) at 201 secretary, provost-marshal, clerk of the naval office, and chief clerk and registrar of the various courts were often patent offices. 103 For an informative decision on how the patent system operated, which also illustrated the many abuses that occurred in connection with it, see R v Vaughan (1769) 4 Burr 2494, 98 ER 308. It concerned an attempt to bribe a Privy Councilor (the Duke of Grafton, First Lord of the Treasury at the time) to procure a patent for the reversion of the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court of Jamaica. The Court referred to the office as one that "had been sold, devised, leased, and very badly executed by deputy" (at 2496, 309) and one that "is granted by letters patent under the the appointment of patent officers or the manner in which they, or their deputies, executed their duties, let alone speedily remove the patentees or their deputies from their offices when that was desirable. Not only were incompetent persons appointed to the offices; they, in turn, often appointed incompetent and corrupt deputies to perform their duties locally. Furthermore, patentees themselves often had little control over or indeed any contact with their deputies. Business between them was increasingly handled by brokers, who charged a commission, for instance for obtaining the services of a deputy who was often merely the highest bidder for the appointment. Finally, patentees were usually well able to defend their privileges and profits against any complaints. They were often supported and defended by the relevant minister or governmental institution that had supported their appointment and had a vested interest in defeating colonial attempts to have patentees removed or controlled. Thus, the Lords of the Admiralty, who appointed Vice-Admiralty judges and court officials in the colonies, and the Commissioners of Customs who appointed customs officers there, could be relied on to support their appointees against gubernatorial censure.
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However, growing opposition in the course of the eighteenth century increasingly focused on the abuses inherent in the system such as the appointment of non-resident, absent patentee officers and the tendency of patent officers and their deputies to demand excessive fees for their services.
The first reaction to complaints and the first steps towards reform came in the form of the Colonial Leave of Absence Act, 1782. 105 It provided that every holder of a colonial office conferred by royal Letters Patent had to reside in the colony and perform his duties in person, unless he received leave of absence, which had to be granted by the governor of the colony. 106 However, the Act applied only Great Seal of England" and therefore governed by the common law (at 2500, 311). In rejecting the defence's contention that "[t]he solicitation to take money for an office in the colonies, is no offence", and finding for the Crown that such an attempt was a misdemeanour at common law and punishable as such, Lord Mansfield thought (ibid) that even "[i]f these transactions are believed to be frequent, it is time to put a stop to them. A minister trusted by the King to recommend fit persons to offices would betray that trust, and disappoint that confidence, if he should secretly take a bribe for that recommendation". See It is also known as Lord Shelburne's Act; he was secretary of state at the time (see n 38 above). 106 Section 1 prevented the granting "in future" of any "Patent Office" to be exercised in any Crown colony for any longer term than during such time as the grantee or appointee discharged the duty concerned in person and behaved well in it. It referred to the practice of "granting offices in colonies to persons residing and intending to reside in Britain that had long been complained of in the colonies as causing inconveniences from a neglect of duty". In terms of s 2, if the patentee was wilfully absent without leave or neglected the duties of his office, the governor was permitted prospectively 107 and excepted patents already issued. It was resented by those who could benefit by the system; loopholes were soon found 108 and the Act was rendered practically ineffective.
Consequently, the colonial patent office system expanded greatly during the last decades of the eighteenth and first decade of the nineteenth century. It had become an important political tool, frequently used to thank supporters and loyal party members. It was therefore, not surprisingly, increasingly the system's financial implications and its burden on public funds, rather than the abuses linked to it or its administrative inefficiency, which became the focus of those intent on reforming it.
In 1821, the Red Book 109 estimated that the value of sinecures in the colonies amounted to nearly ₤100 000 per annum, "exclusive of those in the Cape of Good Hope, the Isle of France and Malta, which probably amount to as much more".
It was also on the grounds of financial concerns that the first effective attack on colonial patent offices was launched. 110 The House of Commons Select Committee on Public Expenditure of the United Kingdom, appointed in 1806, produced a series of reports. Its third report of 1807 dealt with offices, places, sinecures and pensions, This select committee, the Select Committee on Sinecure Offices, was again chiefly concerned with such offices in the United Kingdom itself. However, it to remove him. 107 Section 4 made it clear that nothing in the Act "shall operate to the prejudice of any subsisting Grant of such Office or Offices". 108 For instance, appointments were made otherwise than by the specifically mentioned Letters Patent (eg, by the seal of the colony) so that they were not covered by the Act, or some high authority in London simply ordered the governor to grant the patentee leave of absence. 109 See (n 101) at vii. 110 The attack on sinecures in the political system, begun by Whigs in order to undermine the Tory King in the 1780s, eventually succeeded through the quite unobtrusive efforts of Tory governments in the nineteenth century (see Bourne (n 83) at 19-21 for considerable detail on the suppression of sinecures). It referred, at various places in its report to, eg, "an ambiguous and middle class, partaking in the nature of Pensions, in as much as no service is performed, but still ranking under the head of Offices, from the name of official business having been continued after the functions are become extinct and obsolete", that is, the appointed official was still remunerated although the functions and office had become obsolete. Such sinecures, it pointed out, were given as pensions ("to secure a honourable retreat"), or as an accompaniment to a peerage for the reward of personal service, and were difficult to distinguish from offices "such as are wholly or chiefly executed by Deputy". also heard evidence concerning patent offices in the colonies and had before it the voluminous returns of those offices sent by colonial governors in accordance with instructions issued in 1808. This Committee's first report, in 1810, 113 mentioned the colonies in passing and observed that despite the residential requirement of the Act of 1782, the duties attached to many offices continued to be performed wholly by deputy. The patentees, it observed, "enjoy perfect sinecures".
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This Committee's second report, in 1811, 115 contained more detail on colonial patent offices, and on 116 colonial officers appointed by the Admiralty, most of whose duties were performed by deputy. These included, in the various colonial Vice-Admiralty courts, seventeen registrars and fourteen marshals, 117 most of whose duties were performed by deputies. The exact amount of their salaries or emoluments, which stemmed from fees and thus depended on the quantity of business transacted in the courts, 118 was unknown but, the Committee pointed out, it was clearly more than enough to remunerate the persons performing the duties of the office. The committee's third report, in 1812, 119 contained further detail on the about 100 colonial patent offices, many of which, including some important ones, were served by deputies.
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Although the evidence before the Select Committee on Sinecure Offices afforded the first clear and detailed account of the way in which the patent office system operated, the Committee did not recommend any specific action on colonial patent offices. However, its reports did draw public attention to the many abuses of the system, in particular the repeated evasions of the Act of 1782.
In 1814, after earlier failed attempts in 1812 and 1813, legislation was eventually passed to address the issue. The Public Offices in Colonies Act, 1814 121 sought to address the loopholes in the Act of 1782. First, it required the occupants of all colonial offices, in whatever way granted, to reside in the colonies concerned. 114 Since the income of these colonial offices arose altogether from fees payable in the colonies, the matter was not regarded as within the Committee's scope, which was aimed at reducing public expenditure in the United Kingdom, and it therefore did not make any recommendation to regulate or abolish them. of absence by requiring governors, under threat of a financial penalty, to report on any leave granted to the secretary of state, who then had to confirm it. 123 It also required annual reports to be laid before the House of Commons on persons holding offices in the colonies who had been appointed after the passing of the Act but who were not present there to carry out their duties. 124 However, this Act too applied only prospectively and did not affect patent office holders appointed before it was passed.
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These strengthened measures ensured the proper enforcement, for the first time, of the requirement that colonial officials reside in the relevant colony and work for a living themselves. So successful was it that the patent office system almost disappeared from colonial appointments in the twenty years following its passage. No fresh patents of the old type were issued, and as existing patent holders died, the successors appointed had to carry out their duties in person. Nevertheless, appointees were still usually remunerated by fees rather than by fixed salaries.
In 1817, the Select Committee on Finance, 126 investigating the United Kingdom's income and expenditure and ways in which the latter could be reduced without any detriment to the public interest, referred to sinecures and the costs incurred "by the continuance of Offices, either wholly useless, or the Salaries of which appear disproportionate to their actual duties". In respect of colonial offices, it observed that it possessed insufficient information to be able to present a full picture.
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Nevertheless, it thought that the general principles applicable in dealing with them appeared to be, first, enforcing the principal's residence and personal performance, and secondly, reducing remuneration to an amount that was fair and sufficient for the performance of services in the office.
In the years 1833, 1834, and 1835, further select committees were appointed to report on progress in the abolition of sinecures, in both the United Kingdom and the colonies. The first report 128 foresaw the imminent and natural end of the system. In the next year, it was recommended 129 that although very few patentees survived, the and Appendix (1834). Interesting, given the topic of this article, are the observations in this report (at 5-6) on the office of marshal of the Admiralty Court in England. The office, it appeared, was held by the then possessor under a grant during the pleasure of the Crown, while its duties, both of a constant and important nature, were almost entirely discharged by deputy. The Committee recommended that the office be immediately revised and the marshal be required to perform his duties in person. The remuneration from the marshal's office was derived from fees and varied abolition of existing patent offices and the provision of a pension for official services in lieu of sinecures should be considered. The figures provided in the last report,
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as in the earlier ones, clearly highlighted the demise of the colonial patent office system. In 1812, of seventy-one offices in the colonies, some were sinecures and in others, deputies performed the duties. By 1835, twenty-four had been abolished, thirty had been remodelled and new arrangements made, one was vacant and new arrangements for it were contemplated, and of the remainder, none of which was in any Vice-Admiralty court, only four were held by persons not resident in the relevant colony. Thus, the system of colonial patent offices came to an end, and was replaced by a professional colonial service, staffed by salaried men who devoted themselves fully to colonial administration.
5
O'Bryen's appointment as Admiralty marshal at the Cape
Denis O'Bryen's appointment as marshal of the Vice-Admiralty Court at the Cape of Good Hope in 1806 was therefore a patent office appointment. Throughout the period during which he held the office, until his death in 1832, O'Bryen never visited, let alone resided at, the Cape, 131 but a succession of deputies performed the duties of the office. This much appears from various official sources, as well as from O'Bryen's own accounts.
As far as the former are concerned, the second report by the Select Committee on Sinecure Offices 132 in 1811 contains, in an appendix, 133 a list of colonial offices to which appointments had been made by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, with an indication of whether the duties involved were performed personally or by deputy. In respect of the Cape, there is reference to "Dennis O'Bryen, Gentleman, Marshal, appointed 24 Nov 1806". 134 There is no entry for him under the heading from year to year, sometimes falling short of a reasonable annual salary and at other times greatly exceeding that standard. It recommended that the marshal receive a fixed salary on a scale not more than adequate to ensure the discharge of the duties of the office by a competent person, and that the fees collected be paid over to a government fund. From an appendix (at 11) it appears that the "marshal and serjeant-at-mace of the Admiralty Court" referred to was Hugh Lindsay, appointed in 1815, and that the emoluments he derived from his office in 1833 amounted to ₤1 200, subject to the remuneration to be given to his deputy. Henry Hartley (as judge, also giving details of his salary: see n 9 above), William Grey (registrar, in respect of whom alone there was an entry identifying the deputy who executed his office: see "by whom [office] executed; and the names of the deputies, where known", but that must be taken to mean that the relevant information was unknown to the Committee at the time, not that there was no deputy and that O'Bryen performed the duties personally. 135 The Red Book published in 1821 136 contains information on sinecure offices connected to the Cape. It mentions "Denis O'Brien" as "Marshal, Cape of Good Hope" [sic] and notes that his salary was "believed [to be] about ₤800".
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More informative, though, are O'Bryen's own explanations of his appointment. They provide some insight into the surrounding circumstances and his appreciation of the office, the duties it entailed and the benefits it conferred.
further n 174 below), George Kekewick (King's advocate: see again n 11 above), and William David Jennings (King's proctor, appointed in Jun 1809). The information contained in app 5 to the Committee's third report a year later (see n 120 above) is identical, except that it mentioned that the office of King's advocate at the Cape no longer appeared in the latest return. It was further noted that although the Committee had been informed that several of the office-holders listed were at the time resident in the UK, it did not know precisely how many were, because information on residence or non-residence was not required in the returns from the Office of the Admiralty, a further possible explanation the lack of information on O'Bryen mentioned below (in n 135). 135 A footnote explains that whether the various offices were executed by the principal or by a deputy was known only in the instances so noted in the appropriate column, which were ascertained from returns from the respective Vice-Admiralty courts, and which returns were only periodic. 136 See n 101 above. 137 Idem at 190. Earlier editions -1 ed (1816) and 2 ed (1817) -made no mention of O'Bryen.
Other holders of Cape sinecures (not all of whom were necessarily non-resident there) included in the 4 ed were: (1) T Peregrine Courtenay, MP, secretary to the Board of Control, receiving an estimated ₤750 in respect of the office of agent [in the UK] for the Cape (at 103); (2) F Dashwood, receiver general at the Cape, earning ₤4 000 (see also Philip (n 9) at 88-89, mentioning that Francis Dashwood was married to Lady Ann, the daughter of the seventh Earl of Lauderdale, had arrived at the Cape in 1797, was receiver of revenue 1807-1819, president of the Lombard Bank 1808-1814, and collector of customs at Cape Town from 1819) (at 109); (3) James Nagle, suppressed deputy commissary of the Cape, earning ₤100 (at 187); (4) Lord Charles Somerset, governor, who earned an estimated ₤14 000; (5) R Spencer, vaccinating surgeon (Philip (n 9) at 397 has Richard Spencer as garrison surgeon at the Cape from 1806, surgeon to the governor's household from 1808, and vaccinating surgeon from 1811 until he left the Cape in 1817) (at 220); (6) JA Truter, who earned ₤6 000 as Chief Justice and ₤4 000 as president of the Orphan Chamber (at 232); and (7) "Mr Zeerogel, storekeeper", earning ₤1 500 (at 248). It must be borne in mind that the information contained in the Red Book was not always correct or complete. In respect of the last-mentioned appointment, eg, the reference is probably to Aegidius Benedictus Ziervogel (1762-1818), a Swedish immigrant, who was interpreter, translator and vendue master in the Cape Vice-Admiralty Court (and probably elsewhere too) from 1800 and again from 1807. He was the grandfather of EB (Egidius Benedictus) Watermeyer (1824-1867), later a judge in the Cape Supreme Court.
From a letter 138 to William Windham, at the time secretary of state for war and the colonies, 139 written on 11 October 1806, some two months after his appointment in August as Admiralty marshal, it appears that O'Bryen was not quite satisfied and obliquely asked for a further or better appointment in addition to or instead of that one.
He addressed the letter to Windham, although he realised that he obviously had an "abundance of clients for the widest range of your possible patronage". However, O'Bryen explained, the "peculiarities in my misfortune", including the expenses incurred in services rendered to Fox and his party over a period of many years, as well as his advanced age (of fifty-one years) which militated against his seeking a fresh career and fortune, left him no choice but to make such a direct request.
In support of his request for what he termed "proper recompense", O'Bryen referred in his letter to Fox's favourable disposition towards him and to the fact that he had made the same request to Fox 140 in February 1806. He pointed out, further, that "when Lord Howick gave me the office at the Cape" he had added that although Lord Grenville had nothing further to offer him at the time, as soon as something turned up he (O'Bryen) would have it.
As far as "the Marshalship of the Vice Admiralty Court at the Cape" was concerned, O'Bryen stressed that Lord Howick was aware that he was thankful for it, but "even his Lordship's good will cannot make the office better than its nature admits". The office, he pointed out, in time of peace offered little recompense and even in time of war its benefits were doubtful.
141 A better, but probably still inadequate, Not having had a response to his earlier request, despite having been assured verbally that the matter would be settled soon, O'Bryen again wrote to Windham some months later, on 10 March 1807. 143 He expressed himself "still in hope of a better sinecure appointment" and restated and expanded on his reasons for his request, 144 and also offered to meet with Windham in person. O'Bryen's entreaties were to no avail. There were, it seems, other more meritorious or, probably, more influential candidates to be considered 145 and, in any event, the Whigs were soon out of office.
An aspect of his appointment that clearly troubled O'Bryen was the low financial return from it and the perception held by others that it was in fact a rather lucrative position, at a time when he constantly had to fight off creditors. In a letter to colonel McMahon, secretary to the Prince of Wales, dated 8 March 1809, 146 he wrote that "my patent office, given to me a few days before Mr Fox's death -this grand provision for a life of service, characterized by Mr Fox as 'admitting no competition on the score of merits' -this valuable appointment that was to sweep away the accumulations of near thirty years difficulties and to be the source of solace in approaching age, has yielded to me, in all, from the first hour to this day, no less a sum than two hundred pounds".
A further source of some importance in this regard is the evidence O'Bryen gave to the Select Committee on Sinecure Offices by way of a letter dated 31 March 1811 in response to questions the committee had sent him a few days before. 147 In a general introductory statement, O'Bryen explained that for his services to the government, he had "received in 1806, towards a compensation", the office of Marshal of the Vice-Admiralty Court at the Cape, and then somewhat sarcastically continued that although he had never foreseen that he would be "over-hauled for my treasures hence", he would nevertheless "in respectful obedience" answer the questions posed.
His answers seem to indicate that O'Bryen had but an imprecise idea of the nature of the office to which he had been appointed, but was fully informed of its financial implications. Questioned on the duties of the Admiralty marshal at the Cape, he merely replied that they were the same as, but of a lesser extent than, those 143 This letter is included in app 1, item 3 at viii-ix in his Narrative (see n 155 below). 144 He referred again to Lord Howick's statement on 12 Aug 1806 that as soon as Lord Grenville had something to give, he would give it to him (O'Bryen), a statement that was made on the very day after his Lordship had nominated him to the office of Admiralty marshal at the Cape and when he was engaged in sending him his thanks. He also mentioned a remark by Lord Grenville that (the by then seriously ill) Fox's mind should be freed from uneasiness on the score of O'Bryen as soon as possible. of the marshal of the Admiralty Court in Doctors' Commons. He explained that his health, age and private affairs did not allow him to perform any of the duties in person, but that he had availed himself of the power, expressly vested in him by his patent, of providing "a capable deputy". He stressed that that diminished "my own possible gains by a proportionate remuneration to my substitute". He had appointed his deputy himself and in reply to the question whether the appointment had been approved by anyone, he merely and, as will appear, quite prophetically, explained that the nature of this appointment made it probable that the Court "would disapprove of an incompetent delegate". In reply to the question whether he or his deputy had any custody of public money or records, O'Bryen could do no more than respond that he was not aware that any such custody constituted any part of the duties of the office, with the exception of records of the office business. Finally, he indicated that the deputy had given him security for the faithful execution of his deputation, but that he himself had never been asked to give any security.
In regard to the income earned from his office, he stated that neither he nor, as far as he knew, his deputy had ever received one shilling "under the name of salary" as the office did not come with a salary 148 and he was given to understand "that in peace it is not worth one farthing".
The total amount of all the emoluments he had received in the nearly five years since his appointment in August 1806, was ₤2 193 16s 3d, of which half had been retained by his deputy. 149 The emoluments of his office, he explained further, arose entirely from naval captures and not a shilling came from any other source. In addition, the capture of Mauritius in 1810 and the prospect of a Vice-Admiralty court being established there would ensure that his "office necessarily becomes in most strict and liberal sense of the designation, an office sine cura".
On 12 October 1820, at the time when he faced widely reported criminal charges of conspiracy 150 that had drawn no doubt unwelcome attention to himself, O'Bryen felt obliged to write a letter to the press correcting certain impressions created by earlier reports. One of these was that he held, or had held, "a sinecure place under the present government".
151 "The only office which I possess", O'Bryen explained, "is a colonial appointment, conferred upon me more than 14 years since by Lord 148 The income to be derived from it depended on the fees collected by the marshal, or his deputy, in the performance of his duties. 149 He pointed out that if the regulations introduced into the Admiralty Court in London (unjustifiably, in his view) had been in force during the whole period of his Cape appointment, he would have received less than ₤700. He further observed that the rights and perquisites of which his office had (contrary to the practice of all other Vice-Admiralty courts) been stripped, had been claimed by his representatives at the Cape, but whether anything would come of that claim depended on the outcome of litigation. I could find no evidence of any such litigation. 150 See, further, n 164 below. 151 See 12 Oct 1820 The Times at 3; the same letter had also appeared the previous day in the Morning Chronicle (see app 2 at ix-x of his Narrative (n 155) below).
[Howick] (when his Lordship was First Lord of the Admiralty), at the instance of Mr Fox". However, the attacks continued.
In a reply to this letter the following day, 152 one Charles Pearson 153 seemed to suggest that O'Bryen's denial of holding a sinecure office was misleading. "As the place alluded to is a most lucrative situation, and as, if there are any duties belonging to it, they are, or ought to be, performed at the Cape of Good Hope -and as Mr Denis O'Bryen has enjoyed the benefits of the appointment for 14 years, and has not, I believe, been ever near the Cape -I should have conceived myself justified in calling the situation a sinecure place". Nevertheless, he then sarcastically begged O'Bryen's pardon for calling him a "sinecurist" and sought to correct his "error" by admitting that "he fully earns all that he receives".
On 17 Even in the year before his death, O'Bryen was still bitter about his appointment. In a letter in August 1831, he again observed that it had "turned out to be a mere mockery".
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Clearly, then, O'Bryen's patent office appointment as marshal of the ViceAdmiralty Court at the Cape was a great disappointment to him. He had expected, and had been led to believe, that he would receive something worth much more, an expectation no doubt supported as much by his own evaluation of the services he had rendered to the Whigs as by his always-dire financial situation. The fact that he had to defend this disappointment publicly only added insult to injury.
6
O'Bryen's later life A recurring theme throughout his life was Denis O'Bryen's continuous financial distress. He perpetually struggled to escape from the clutches of creditors and by 1806 had already done so on three occasions. 158 In 1811 the Whig party had to provide him with financial relief 159 and in 1814 he appears to have landed in the Fleet insolvent debtors' Prison. 160 In May 1832, only a few months before his death, O'Bryen was again in court as a debtor. The newspaper report of his appearance describes him as someone who "had for many years been in the employment of Government" and who had received up to the last quarter of the Duke of Wellington's administration,
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₤1 400 a year, and from that time ₤500 a year, but who was now unable to account for the manner in which he had disposed of his property. While the production and posting of the treasonable placards and Franklin's role were never in question, O'Bryen's involvement was. His defence admitted that while O'Bryen was intimately acquainted with Franklin whom he had received at home, one could not infer the required guilt from that circumstance alone. 166 Various public figures were then called on to testify to O'Bryen's character. 167 The jury speedily 165 O'Bryen was charged with "conspiracy to excite sedition and disaffection against the person and government of his late and present Majesty; and in order to effect such conspiracy, for having published divers seditious and treasonable handbills and placards, from the year 1818 to the present period" and "conspiracy to vilify and disgrace certain persons who have been distinguished as friends of her Majesty during the late proceedings". Franklin was also charged with treason, but did not plead. 166 The evidence had simply not connected O'Bryen in any way with Franklin's conduct nor had it established any involvement in the production and display of the handbills. Mere knowledge, or even possession, of the placards was not proof of the required guilt or of a guilty connection. Further, the defence pointed out that one of the placards produced in fact contained a "gross attack on the character" of that great statesman, the late Fox, and observed that the jury was quite aware "that Mr O'Bryen had, for a long time, been intimately connected with Mr Fox, and honoured with his friendship. He had been, and still was, on terms of intimate acquaintance with many eminent men, friends of that great man". 167 These included the Duke of Bedford (John Russell, the sixth Duke of Bedford (1766-1839), Whig politician, MP for Tavistock 1788-1790, member of the "ministry of all talents" under Lord Grenville 1806-1807, and father of Prime Minister John Russell, the first Earl of Russell; Russell Square, WC1, was named after the earls and dukes of Bedford who owned the area in the eighteenth century); Lord Holland; Lord Erskine (see n 60 above); and Sir J Macintosh. However, these witnesses could only testify on their knowledge of O'Bryen as a member of the Whig party before 1806, "not having had any acquaintance with him for several years hence". 168 They did not even leave the courtroom but merely "turned round in the box" and consulted together for a few moments. 177 received his appointment as registrar from his elder brother in May 1807, such favouritism not going unnoticed, at least in later years. 178 William Grey occupied the office of registrar until his death in August 1817. Throughout the period of his appointment as registrar, 179 there was always a deputy at the Cape who performed his duties for him. The deputy registrar from 1807 to 1813 was Henry Buckton, 180 and from 1813 to 1817 it was George Cadogan, who after that became registrar until 1837.
What, then, may be said about Denis O'Bryen's deputies at the Cape? Their brief story 182 is an example, if any were required, of the defects in the colonial patent office system, at least in those cases where the appointee was not resident in the colony in question.
First there was Henry Buckton. Although deputy registrar of the Court, it appears that Buckton also acted as deputy marshal for a short period from June 1807, maybe before O'Bryen could appoint someone to represent him at the Cape. pension in January 1833. 186 Bentinck served as deputy marshal in the Vice-Admiralty Court from 1809 until 1812. 187 The last but most controversial of the four deputy marshals during O'Bryen's tenure was William James Birkwood. He was appointed to the office in March 1812 and as from 1815 was simultaneously the clerk to the collector of customs. This eventually caused problems for both Birkwood 188 and his principal in London, Denis O'Bryen.
In 1820, a shortfall was discovered in the public revenue "owing to the misconduct and peculation" of "Mr W Birkwood, a clerk in the office of the Collector of Customs". 189 Birkwood was prosecuted before the Council of Justice at the instance of the collector of customs Charles Blair 190 and was ordered to render an account and vouchers for the deficiency. The order was confirmed by the Court of Appeals in January 1822, but in September 1825 when he had not complied with it, Birkwood was condemned by the Council to civil imprisonment, with a view to the final resolution of "this long outstanding Case".
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Earlier Earl Bathurst, the secretary of state for war and the colonies, had called on Blair to make up the deficiency. Blair requested a delay so that governor Somerset could explain what had happened. It was also pointed out that it was uncertain whether the security he was required to provide to the amount of the deficiency could be furnished.
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Blair also wrote an explanatory "Memorial" to the Treasury in August 1826 193 in which he pointed out that he was being called on to make good a shortfall that arose from the delinquency of a clerk he had not nominated or appointed. He did not Earl Bathurst, 11 Aug 1826 (idem vol 27 at 255-256), pointing out that it was uncertain whether on Blair's death any personal security would be available and that a stoppage of his salary, for which authority of the Treasury would be required, would be the only way to provide security. In another letter, dated 4 Aug 1826, Bourke had explained to Sir Richard Plasket, secretary to the government, that on leaving the colony for England (before Bathurst's letter arrived), Somerset had acquainted himself with every circumstance connected with the matter in order to fully explain Blair's position to both Bathurst and the Lords Commissioner of the Treasury on his arrival in London (idem vol 27 at 256-257). 193 See idem vol 27 at 257-258. Blair pointed out that on arrival after his appointment as Collector of Customs at the Cape in 1808, he had found a clerk and cashier "fixed as part of the establishment". On the death of that officer, the colonial government had named a successor, and on his retirement, it had appointed James Birkwood in April 1815. In November 1819, Birkwood admitted to Blair that there was a shortfall in the cash received from custom dues, in an as yet undetermined amount. Blair then immediately requested a special accountant to examine the books of the Customs House and to report on the amount of the deficiency. This investigation revealed that Birkwood had paid in less than he had collected and received; and that the deficiency amounted to 15 098 rixdollars, 4 skillings and 3 stivers in Cape currency.
consider himself obliged to do so, and the opinions of three eminent counsel (one of whom was the solicitor-general) confirmed his "irresponsibility". In this he was fully supported by the colonial government.
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Birkwood himself was dismissed from his customs office by a notice in the Cape Gazette on 19 November 1819, and someone else was appointed in his place.
That caused a problem for the colonial government, however, for Birkwood still held the office of deputy marshal of the Vice-Admiralty Court. The governor approached the Admiralty judge, George Kekewich, concerning the damage that might be done to the Court's name if it retained Birkwood in its employment. 195 However, Kekewich realised that the crux of the problem was that Birkwood had not been appointed by the Court. He explained "that the Office of Marshal is a patent appointment and that by that Patent the Marshal possesses the sole Power of appointing his deputy". In these circumstances, he did not consider himself competent to remove an officer from the Court in which he presided and "against whom there exists no charge of delinquency ". 196 This left the local government in a quandary. Even if it believed that Birkwood ought to be removed as deputy marshal, it did not wish to interfere with the ViceAdmiralty Court "whose freedom from the control of this Government appears to have been recognized by the opinion of the Attorney General contained in [a] despatch to Lord Caledon" as long ago as March 1808. It was also not clear whether the colonial government itself could suspend the deputy appointed by the holder of a patent office, and if so in what circumstances.
197 It accordingly informed Kekewich in August 1826
198 that it had referred the matter to London for advice and instructions. Some months later, in June 1827, the secretary of state replied that the Lord High Admiral, when the matter was referred to him, had ordered Birkwood's dismissal from his office of deputy marshal of the Vice-Admiralty Court at the Cape of Good 194 Thus, on 17 Nov 1826, with reference to a letter from Bathurst enquiring whether he wanted to make any representation on Blair's liability to make good the shortfall, governor Somerset replied that he had the strongest grounds for considering Blair to be "a gentleman of the most rigid honour and integrity" and that the deficit in question had "occurred solely from the dishonesty of a man who had the art to obtain Blair's fullest confidence which he basely betrayed" (idem vol 28 at 329-330 
